All Post-Quantum, PQC Posts
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) – The Overlooked Quantum Threat
What is "Trust Now, Forge Later" (TNFL)? Most discussions about quantum computing threats focus on “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) - the idea that adversaries can collect encrypted data today and store it, hoping a future quantum computer will break the encryption and expose sensitive information. This risk is very real, especially for data that needs to remain confidential for decades (think government secrets, health…
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Quantum Readiness Is Not (Just) a Vendor Problem
In the recent IBM's “Secure the Post-Quantum Future” report 62% of executives admitted that their organization is waiting for vendors to make them quantum‑safe. In other words, they expect cloud providers, network equipment makers and software vendors to embed post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) so that internal teams can simply apply updates. This mindset is understandable - modern enterprises depend on vast supply chains - but it…
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Getting Started With Quantum Security and PQC Migration
Your complete roadmap to quantum-proofing your organization — from boardroom mandate to operational crypto-agility. This practitioner-curated Deep Dive series collects the PostQuantum.com articles you need to launch and run a quantum-readiness program, organized along the lifecycle most teams actually follow: securing executive buy-in and budget, performing cryptographic discovery and inventory, building a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), scoring and prioritizing risk, standing up governance and…
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Quantum-Readiness / PQC Full Program Description (Telecom Example)
Preparing a large telecom (or any enterprise) for the post-quantum cryptography era is a massive, multi-faceted undertaking, but it is achievable with foresight, resources, and commitment. We’ve seen that it involves much more than just installing new algorithms - it’s about transforming an organization’s approach to cryptography across potentially thousands of applications and devices, under uncertain timelines and in coordination with many external players. In…
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Q-Day
Forget Q-Day Predictions – Regulators, Insurers, Investors, Clients Are Your New Quantum Clock
Whether you personally believe Q-Day will come in 5 years or 50, the world around you isn’t taking chances - and neither can you. As a CISO, you’re now being implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) told by every corner of your ecosystem that quantum preparedness is mandatory. Regulators demand it via hard deadlines. Key clients and partners demand it in contracts and RFPs. Insurers will soon…
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Quantum Computing Companies
What 60+ Quantum Hardware Roadmaps Actually Tell Us
What do 60+ quantum hardware roadmaps tell us when you read them together instead of one at a time? This capstone article synthesizes the quantum computing company landscape into strategic insight: which modalities have the most commercial momentum, where the industry's centre of gravity sits geographically, how roadmap promises compare to demonstrated milestones, and what all of this means for the timeline to fault-tolerant and…
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Stop Asking What Number a Quantum Computer Factored. Ask These Five Questions Instead
One of the laziest talking points in quantum security is that quantum computing has “gone nowhere” because people still talk about factoring 15. That confuses an early proof-of-concept with the real engineering path to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The 2001 Nature experiment explicitly described factoring 15 as the “simplest instance” of Shor’s algorithm, and later analysis showed that compiled factoring demos can depend more…
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Post-Quantum, PQC, Quantum Security
Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD)
Modern quantum key distribution (QKD) has always carried a slightly uncomfortable subtext: the math may be information-theoretic, but the box on the rack is engineered. And engineered systems fail in messy, non-theoretical ways. That gap - between "provably secure on paper" and "secure in a live network with real detectors, lasers, firmware, calibration routines, and supply chains" - is exactly the space that device-independent QKD…
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