Quantum Security & PQC
Post-quantum cryptography, PQC migration, crypto-agility, cryptographic inventory, CBOM, and practical quantum readiness — from executive mandate to operational deployment.
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How ECC Became the Easiest Quantum Target
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) will likely fall to quantum computers before RSA does - a cruel irony, since ECC's smaller keys were considered an advantage. Shor's algorithm needs roughly 2,330 logical qubits and 126 billion Toffoli gates to break P-256…
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Securing Quantum Computers – Threat at the Quantum-Classical Interface
A global race is on to build cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) - machines powerful enough to break current encryption. Governments and industry are pouring billions into quantum R&D, and intelligence analysts scrutinize whether a geopolitical rival might secretly be…
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Q-Day Isn’t an Outage – It’s a Confidence Crisis
Cybersecurity lore often paints Q-Day (the moment a quantum computer cracks RSA/ECC encryption) as an instant "Quantum Apocalypse" where every system gets hacked immediately. Planes falling from the sky, banks drained in seconds, an overnight digital Armageddon - if that…
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Post-Quantum Negligence: Legal Risks of Failing to Prepare for the Quantum Threat
Quantum computing is no longer a far-off hypothesis - it’s a rapidly emerging reality that could render today’s encryption obsolete. For CISOs and their boards, this means a new kind of cybersecurity crisis is on the horizon. Sensitive data that…
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Sovereignty in the PQC Era: Standards, Trust, and Crypto-Agility
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is entering the standards stage, with the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently selecting the first quantum-resistant algorithms. However, the future of PQC will not be as straightforward as simply adopting NIST’s choices globally.…
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Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) – The Overlooked Quantum Threat
What is "Trust Now, Forge Later" (TNFL)? Most discussions about quantum computing threats focus on “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) - the idea that adversaries can collect encrypted data today and store it, hoping a future quantum computer will break…
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Quantum Readiness Is Not (Just) a Vendor Problem
In the recent IBM's “Secure the Post-Quantum Future” report 62% of executives admitted that their organization is waiting for vendors to make them quantum‑safe. In other words, they expect cloud providers, network equipment makers and software vendors to embed post‑quantum…
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Getting Started With Quantum Security and PQC Migration
Your complete roadmap to quantum-proofing your organization — from boardroom mandate to operational crypto-agility. This practitioner-curated Deep Dive series collects the PostQuantum.com articles you need to launch and run a quantum-readiness program, organized along the lifecycle most teams actually follow:…
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Quantum-Readiness / PQC Full Program Description (Telecom Example)
Preparing a large telecom (or any enterprise) for the post-quantum cryptography era is a massive, multi-faceted undertaking, but it is achievable with foresight, resources, and commitment. We’ve seen that it involves much more than just installing new algorithms - it’s…
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Forget Q-Day Predictions – Regulators, Insurers, Investors, Clients Are Your New Quantum Clock
Whether you personally believe Q-Day will come in 5 years or 50, the world around you isn’t taking chances - and neither can you. As a CISO, you’re now being implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) told by every corner of your…
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Stop Asking What Number a Quantum Computer Factored. Ask These Five Questions Instead
One of the laziest talking points in quantum security is that quantum computing has “gone nowhere” because people still talk about factoring 15. That confuses an early proof-of-concept with the real engineering path to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The…
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Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD)
Modern quantum key distribution (QKD) has always carried a slightly uncomfortable subtext: the math may be information-theoretic, but the box on the rack is engineered. And engineered systems fail in messy, non-theoretical ways. That gap - between "provably secure on…
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Marin’s Law on Crypto-Agility: Adaptability Determines Survivability
Thesis: Migration time to safer cryptography is inversely proportional to an organization’s crypto-agility. Formally: Let A denote an organization’s crypto-agility (0 ≤ A ≤ 1) and Y the wall-clock time required to replace a cryptographic primitive across all in-scope systems.…
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Why “They’ve Only Factored 15” Is the Wrong Way to Judge Quantum Computing
Early Shor demos were proofs of control, not the real scoreboard. The path to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer runs through error correction, logical qubits, and fault tolerance - not through a neat sequence of ever-larger classroom factorizations. One of…
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How You, Too, Can Predict Q-Day (Without the Hype)
For three decades, Q-Day has been “just a few years away.” I want to show you how to make your own informed prediction on when Q-Day will arrive. Counting physical qubits by itself is misleading. To break RSA you need…
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