All Post-Quantum, PQC Posts
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Post-Quantum
Why We Need a Quantum Security ISAC
Quantum computing promises revolutionary capabilities, but it also poses unprecedented threats to cybersecurity. Experts warn of a looming “Quantum Apocalypse” scenario - the day when a sufficiently advanced quantum computer can crack encryption like RSA or ECC, exposing sensitive data that was once considered secure. And of course, there's the already present "harvest now, decrypt later." The potential impact of cryptography-breaking quantum computers is global…
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Post-Quantum
Securing Quantum Computers – Threat at the Quantum-Classical Interface
A global race is on to build cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) - machines powerful enough to break current encryption. Governments and industry are pouring billions into quantum R&D, and intelligence analysts scrutinize whether a geopolitical rival might secretly be ahead. Yet amid this focus on who builds a quantum codebreaker first, an alternative threat vector is often overlooked: an adversary might not need to…
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Post-Quantum
Q-Day Isn’t an Outage – It’s a Confidence Crisis
Cybersecurity lore often paints Q-Day (the moment a quantum computer cracks RSA/ECC encryption) as an instant "Quantum Apocalypse" where every system gets hacked immediately. Planes falling from the sky, banks drained in seconds, an overnight digital Armageddon - if that nightmare doesn’t happen, some assume Q-Day wasn’t so bad after all. But this view misses a crucial point. The real catastrophe of Q-Day isn’t that…
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Post-Quantum
Post-Quantum Negligence: Legal Risks of Failing to Prepare for the Quantum Threat
Quantum computing is no longer a far-off hypothesis - it’s a rapidly emerging reality that could render today’s encryption obsolete. For CISOs and their boards, this means a new kind of cybersecurity crisis is on the horizon. Sensitive data that is safely encrypted now may be sitting like a ticking time bomb, waiting to be cracked by tomorrow’s quantum machines. The message is clear: security…
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Post-Quantum
Sovereignty in the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Era
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is entering the standards stage, with the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently selecting the first quantum-resistant algorithms. However, the future of PQC will not be as straightforward as simply adopting NIST’s choices globally. A strong push for digital sovereignty is emerging around the world, driven by eroding trust in foreign (particularly U.S.) technology. Nations are seeking greater control…
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Post-Quantum
Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) – The Overlooked Quantum Threat
What is "Trust Now, Forge Later" (TNFL)? Most discussions about quantum computing threats focus on “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) - the idea that adversaries can collect encrypted data today and store it, hoping a future quantum computer will break the encryption and expose sensitive information. This risk is very real, especially for data that needs to remain confidential for decades (think government secrets, health…
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Post-Quantum
Quantum Readiness Is Not (Just) a Vendor Problem
In the recent IBM's “Secure the Post-Quantum Future” report 62% of executives admitted that their organization is waiting for vendors to make them quantum‑safe. In other words, they expect cloud providers, network equipment makers and software vendors to embed post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) so that internal teams can simply apply updates. This mindset is understandable - modern enterprises depend on vast supply chains - but it…
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Post-Quantum
Quantum-Readiness / PQC Full Program Description (Telecom Example)
Preparing a large telecom (or any enterprise) for the post-quantum cryptography era is a massive, multi-faceted undertaking, but it is achievable with foresight, resources, and commitment. We’ve seen that it involves much more than just installing new algorithms - it’s about transforming an organization’s approach to cryptography across potentially thousands of applications and devices, under uncertain timelines and in coordination with many external players. In…
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