Table of Contents
Introduction
Fear sells – or so some vendors seem to think. For decades, a steady drumbeat of ominous warnings has proclaimed that a cryptography-breaking quantum computer is just around the corner. At security conferences and in sales pitches, I’ve had vendors lean in and whisper dramatic claims: “A friend at Fort Meade says quantum computing is farther along than we think.” That did not happen recently – it was in 2001! They name-drop the NSA or hint at secret intelligence, hoping to scare organizations into panic-buying their “quantum-safe” solutions. It’s the oldest trick in the book, invoking a boogeyman to push product.
But when it comes to quantum threats, this kind of fear-mongering doesn’t help anyone – not customers, not the industry, and not even the vendors themselves. In fact, it’s doing more harm than good.
Crying Wolf with Quantum Computers
Already a few years after the publication of Shor’s algorithm (1995), we entered the age of quantum snake oil. By early 2000s, every security vendor and their mother was peddling “quantum-safe” products as if a cryptopocalyptic Q-Day – the day quantum computers break our encryption – were imminent. As of today, a full-blown code-breaking quantum computer is about as real as the Death Star.
These scare tactics stretch far beyond the evidence. Remember the 1990s hype around “unbreakable” ciphers with secret algorithms? Same story – all hat, no cattle. “Quantum” became the buzzword slapped on every solution, as if it were pixie dust that magically makes your VPN invincible. Spoiler: it doesn’t. Seasoned security folks have seen this movie before and can spot the buzzword bingo a mile away.
Vendors often paint quantum as an imminent ticking time bomb to scare buyers – a strategy that savvy CISOs have learned to see through. To crank up the FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt), some vendors even insinuate that government insiders are alarmed. I’ve heard the hushed assertions that “NSA is worried about quantum!” as if that alone is proof of an impending disaster. Sure, the NSA and other agencies have issued warnings about future quantum risks – but those are calls to prepare early, not claims that a secret megacomputer is about to pop out of a lab tomorrow.
Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence, and that evidence just isn’t there. Every time a flashy headline or research preprint suggests “RSA has been broken!”, experts quickly pump the brakes and debunk the overblown claims. It has happened many times in the last two decades. The reality is that no one has demonstrated a quantum computer anywhere close to the scale needed to threaten modern cryptography – not in public, and certainly not in secret.
Fear Tactics Fall Flat with CISOs
Here’s the irony: while some vendors think doomsday rhetoric is a great sales hook, the people holding the budgets aren’t buying it. I say this with my former CISO hat on. When I was a Fortune 500 CISO, I never purchased a security solution because someone waved a scarecrow of an imminent quantum apocalypse. Quite the opposite – if a vendor came at me with baseless, panic-inducing claims based on alleged rumors but without any real evidence, it was an instant red flag. My peers and I would swiftly shuffle that company to the bottom of the consideration list (if not blacklist them outright) for peddling snake oil.
No CISO I know has ever signed a purchase order just because a salesperson cried “Quantum is coming, you’re doomed!” without evidence to back it up. We’ve all heard the boy cry “wolf” too many times.
In fact, in one of my earlier articles I gave fellow security leaders this advice: keep your feet on the ground. Stay informed about quantum developments and have a long-term crypto-agility roadmap, but don’t buy into panic marketing. If a vendor today claims their product is “NSA-grade quantum secure!”, demand specifics – what algorithms, what proof? If they can’t answer, in all likelihood they’re selling vaporware.
Even the experts at the forefront of quantum research maintain that practical quantum codebreaking is still years away. Maybe we should take their word over vendor hyperbole.
Fear-mongering as a sales tactic doesn’t just fail to close deals with savvy customers; it actively erodes your credibility. Security decision-makers base choices on risk management, ROI, and technical due diligence – not on whispered rumors of Fort Meade phantoms. Show a CISO some data, a pilot project, a reference architecture – not a tinfoil hat theory – if you want to be taken seriously.
The Real Cost of Crying “Q-Day” (Boy Who Cried Wolf)
Beyond individual sales, there’s a broader damage from years of quantum fear-mongering: fatigue and cynicism. After 20+ years of hearing “quantum computers will break everything any day now!”, many in the industry have become jaded. It’s the classic boy-who-cried-wolf scenario. Cry “Q-Day is coming next year!” enough times with nothing to show for it, and people stop listening. The next time you raise a real concern, eyes glaze over.
I’ve encountered engineers and executives who roll their eyes at the very mention of quantum risks – not because the threat isn’t real, but because they’ve been numbed by decades of overhyped false alarms. This cynicism is dangerous. It only helps our adversaries. If decision-makers dismiss all quantum risk discussions as hot air, they won’t allocate budget or resources to the actual preparations that need to happen. When people see obvious nonsense labeled “quantum,” they may start dismissing the real science too – the hype “pollutes the discourse” and undermines trust.
In other words, quantum snake oil peddlers aren’t just hawking useless products; they’re also making it harder for the real warnings to be heard.
Ironically, the fear-mongers can cause two equal and opposite bad outcomes: panic or paralysis. In some cases, naïve organizations do panic and throw money at the loudest quantum security vendor, possibly buying an immature or unproven solution that sits idle for years. Far more often, though, the constant cry of “imminent quantum doom!” leads to paralysis – people tune it out and do nothing. They assume it’s all hype and figure they’ll worry about it in 2040 or never. Meanwhile, adversaries could be quietly harvesting encrypted data now to decrypt later when the technology finally catches up.
Both overreaction and underreaction are bad, and the fear-mongering encourages both. It creates noise that drowns out rational signal. The end result: organizations either jump in the wrong direction or stick their heads in the sand. Neither helps the cause of cybersecurity.
Quantum Reality Check: 10+ Years, Not Tomorrow
Let’s set the record straight about the actual timeline and threat landscape, based on what we know today. No, a cryptography-cracking quantum computer isn’t going to pop up overnight like some deus ex machina. The consensus among researchers and industry experts is that we’re still on the order of years – likely 10+ years away – from having a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) capable of breaking current encryption. This isn’t just my personal hunch; it’s reflected in multiple credible analyses.
Crucially, that 10 year outlook is very different from claiming “it’s here now” or “just months away.” Ten years is short in terms of national security planning, but it’s also enough time that running around with your hair on fire is counterproductive. We need to use that time wisely, not waste it.
It’s also worth noting that no evidence suggests some clandestine quantum computer has already been built in secret. Could a well-resourced nation be ahead of the public research curve? Possibly by some years, but building a full-scale CRQC isn’t the kind of thing one can keep under wraps easily – it would likely require scientific breakthroughs that leave a trail in published literature, patent filings, talent recruitment, and massive industrial effort. Until we see clear signs (or until someone publicly factors a large RSA number), the rational stance is cautious optimism: we have a window of a few years to get prepared, if we start now.
And indeed, mainstream science and engineering backs this up. The “crown jewel” of quantum codebreaking, Shor’s algorithm, has only been demonstrated on trivial examples (factoring the number 15 into 3×5, using a few qubits). We are still far from the millions of high-quality qubits needed. All the top quantum hardware teams are racing to improve, but none claim they’ll have a code-breaking machine next year or the year after. So when some random startup or salesman implies they know better – that they have a secret quantum sauce or IBM is hiding a breakthrough – you should be extremely skeptical.
As the saying goes, “trust, but verify” – and in this case, verify with the scientists and engineers actually building these machines. They’ll tell you the truth: exciting progress, yes, but no cryptonite for RSA today.
Time to Prepare – Without the Panic
Here’s the good news: We don’t need scare tactics to take quantum threats seriously. Whether Q-Day hits in 2028, 2035, or 2045, the prudent course is to start swapping out the foundation before the house catches fire.
And make no mistake: this will be the largest, most complex uplift of security infrastructure in modern IT history. We’re talking about replacing or upgrading cryptographic algorithms everywhere they’re embedded – in every server, every application, every device, every IoT sensor, every piece of industrial control equipment. Everywhere. It’s arguably a bigger challenge than the Y2K remediation, because unlike Y2K (which had a fixed deadline and relatively straightforward fixes), the quantum timeline is probabilistic and the crypto components are deeply woven into everything. In an age where we have millions of connected devices, from smart lightbulbs to pacemakers, finding and fixing every vulnerable cryptographic implementation is a massive undertaking. This is a decades-long marathon, not a sprint.
Given that reality, starting early is the only viable option. But starting early doesn’t mean frantic scrambling based on fear; it means methodical preparation: conducting crypto inventories, prioritizing systems that need updates, testing post-quantum algorithms, establishing crypto-agility (the ability to swap out algorithms easily), and so on. The smartest organizations are treating this like any other major emerging risk: assign responsibility, get educated, secure budget for pilot projects, and integrate quantum-resistant tech in a phased way over the coming years. This can even yield side benefits (e.g. discovering outdated systems during your crypto inventory, improving overall crypto agility, etc.) that enhance security today. In short, preparation beats panic, every time.
Transparency Over Hype: Demand Evidence
One more crucial point: as we navigate the next few years, transparency and honesty must be our guiding principles – especially for those of us making predictions or selling solutions. I’ll be the first to admit, I’ve made my own quantum timeline predictions (I’ve been publicly forecasting Q-Day dates for over a decade). The difference is, I always strive to base them on data and clearly stated assumptions. I also publish all the data and papers that inform my prediction. In other words, I want people to question and probe predictions (including mine), not just swallow them wholesale.
A forecast should be a starting point for discussion, not an inscrutable pronouncement. If I turn out wrong, so be it – the prediction can be falsified by real developments, and we’ll all learn something.
This is starkly different from the fear-mongers who throw out wild claims with zero evidence: “Quantum supremacy is here, trust us, we can’t tell you how.” That’s not how science or security works. So, as a rule of thumb, scrutinize any quantum threat claim that dramatically diverges from the prevailing consensus.
If someone insists Q-Day is just months away and everyone else is saying “10 years,” ask them to show their math.
If a vendor says they have a “top-secret quantum breakthrough” that even e.g. IBM somehow missed, be very skeptical (and maybe ask why they’re pitching you instead of accepting their Nobel Prize!)
Chances are, if they can’t talk about it or point to peer-reviewed validation, it’s vapor. And if they pull the “NSA knows” card without substantiation – well, you have my permission to ignore them or politely show them the door.
As cybersecurity professionals, we owe it to ourselves to maintain a healthy BS detector. That means favoring open research, peer-reviewed findings, and collaborative progress over proprietary claims shrouded in fear-driven marketing.
Conclusion
The bottom line: Let’s stop the quantum BS. The threat of quantum computers to our cryptography is real, but real doesn’t mean immediate, and addressing it doesn’t require carnival barking and doom prophecies. Fear-mongering about the “quantum menace” has not magically hastened the advent of better security; it has only bred confusion, complacency, and wasted effort.
Vendors who cry wolf about Q-Day aren’t doing themselves any favors – CISOs are not fooled, and trust once lost is hard to regain. Meanwhile, those genuinely concerned about security could miss the signal amid all the noise, either by panicking at shadows or, worse, ignoring a very addressable challenge until it’s too late.
